Introduction
It has been demonstrated over the last ten years that personnel involved in process system 2 interventions are involved in the causation of more than half of the leaks (96 out of 175, see Figure 2 ) from process plants of offshore installations in the Norwegian sector (Vinnem et al., 2012b) . The leaks in question are those with escalation potential, and a mix of gas, condensate and crude oil leaks, see further details in Section 2. Competence, attitudes, motivation and other relevant factors would therefore influence the performance of interventions and the associated probability of leaks as well as the performance of Emergency Shutdown (ESD) valve maintenance. This is discussed in some depth by Vinnem et al (2010) . Major accidents are rare in offshore operations, the last major accident, at least with fatalities, in offshore operations on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) occurred in 1985.
Even precursor events are quite rare, typically in the order of one event per installation per year. It is therefore crucially important to maintain motivation and awareness in order to prevent as far as possible the occurrence of such precursor events. The next precursor event may be the next major accident if the battery of mitigation barriers on offshore installations has a complete failure.
Major hazard precursor events can be many types of events, such as vessels on collision course, structural defect, temporary loss of well control as well as hydrocarbon (HC) leaks. Kongsvik et al (2011) has explored the extent to which a safety climate measure from a survey on working conditions used in an oil and gas company can be used as a leading and lagging indicator in relation to hydrocarbon leaks on offshore installations. It was found that the safety climate measure could serve as both a leading and lagging indicator for hydrocarbon leaks, based on the empirical evidence in the study.
Other aspects of circumstances of leaks have been discussed by Vinnem (2012a Vinnem ( , 2012b Vinnem ( , 2013a Vinnem ( , 2013b , Røed, Vinnem & Nistov (2012) and Vinnem & Røed (2013) .
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When it comes to details of circumstances of such leaks, we find only to a limited extent such information published. UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) has published annual reports on the hydrocarbon leaks reported from the UK offshore industry, but has not focused on work process modelling. Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) [Norway] has also published annual statistics; see Figure 1 . Edmondson (2004) has published a paper on the experience of HSE, and its campaign to reduce the number of leaks by 50%. Edmondson notes that causes are not associated with great technical complexity, but often failures in basic controls and procedures. This is in line with the findings previously by this author, and the main message of the present paper. The most recent study of leaks reported to HSE is Li (2011) , which confirms the previous analysis.
Apart from the general conclusion, HSE data give no detailed information about operations or controls, the data are mainly focused on equipment details and technical barriers.
The objective of the paper is to study details about the hydrocarbon leaks, particularly the aspect of verification as an operational barrier or control. The importance of verification has been briefly addressed in some of the other papers, but not in any depth. Relevant aspects in this context are also addressed by PSA in their investigation report of one of the most severe HC leaks on the NCS in May, 2012 (PSA, 2012 .
Chapter 2 gives an overview of the hydrocarbon leaks and associated trends. Chapter 3 presents an analysis of the leaks with emphasis on verification as an operational barrier.
Chapter 4 discusses the findings of the study and their applicability. The conclusions are presented in Chapter 5.
Overview of major accident precursor events
The source of the data in this section is PSA, but it is important to stress that the reports and investigations are submitted to PSA on a voluntary basis by the oil companies. The companies submit data on special formats published by PSA twice per year, after which PSA spends 4 considerable time on quality assurance activities. The raw data are held by PSA, but the result presentation is quite extensive, allowing many of the details to be reviewed. PSA is also generous in giving permission for researchers to have access to the data for analysis purposes, provided that presentations are generic or anonymized. PSA has permitted analysis of the data, with the proviso that the result presentations shall be anonymous. All the raw data from the companies have therefore been available for the analysis which is conducted independently. PSA has stated that they encourage analysis of the data, because none of the companies would be able to perform similar analysis, due to confidentiality issues. Only leaks with initial leak rate above 0.1 kg/s are included in the analysis, those below this threshold are not considered to have to potential to escalate into a major accident. The Norwegian data collection is only based on initial leak rate, without considering total volume, duration or any other parameter in a similar manner as in the UK.
The development of the number of leaks per year is documented by Petroleum Safety Authority in the RNNP report (PSA, 2013) . weighted leaks, due to the two leaks with initial leak rate well above 10 kg/s. One of these two leaks was in fact the second highest ever to occur after 1.1.1996 on the NCS.
6
The raw data has information about the type of hydrocarbon leaking in the various events. It should first of all be emphasized that only 'production fluids' are included in the statistics, i.e. petroleum products (after refining) such as diesel, hydraulic oil, lube oil, etc. are not included. This is one of the main differences from the leak statistics published by HSE for the UK continental shelf (Edmundson, 2004; Li, 2011) . The systems involved are process systems and flowlines downstream of the christmas tree (excluding subsea wells) for production wells, including gas injection and gas lift wells. With respect to type of media in the leaks, the following is the distribution for the period 2008 -2010 (Vinnem, 2012b :
 Stabilized oil leak: 9 leaks (21%)
 Oil/gas leak: 3 leaks ( 7%)  Condensate leak: 2 leaks ( 5%)  Gas leak: 29 leaks (67%)
Two thirds are gas leaks, with stabilized oil as the second main category (21%), whereas oil/gas and condensate are seven and five percent. This could be compared to the distribution reported by Li (2011): Oil-24%; 'dual phase'-3%; condensate-4%; gas-44%;
non-process liquids & other-25% (Oil-32%; 'dual phase'-4%; condensate-5%; gas-59%, if non-process leaks are omitted). The oil leaks have a larger contribution in the UK, and the gas leaks a lower contribution. Li has argued that these percentages are to some extent dominated by the smallest leaks. Since these smallest leaks (<0.1 kg/s) are not reported from the Norwegian sector, this may be the explanation of the difference. 
Verification as an operational barrier
Figure 2 has demonstrated that 60% of the HC leaks (> 0.1 kg/s) are associated with manual intervention (Type 'B' and 'C' in the list in Section 2) in pressurised systems, associated with inspection, maintenance, modifications, etc. The majority of these works are carried out based on the steps of an approved work permit, usually also in compliance with an isolation plan which defines explicitly the valves and blindings that are needed to isolate the section or equipment on which the work be carried out. Major maintenance tasks are often carried out during annual (or biannual) shutdown periods with the installation in a safe state, such that many work tasks may be done in parallel without increased risk. Such shutdown periods are usually very well planned and prepared. It has been observed that few leaks occur in association with such periods.
Virtually all of these operations are manually implemented by platform personnel, the compliance with procedures and instructions is crucial. The implementation of the isolation plan prior to the work tasks is carried out by process personnel, usually employed by the operating company. This also applies to the reinstatement, which is the preparation of the process plant for start-up when the work tasks have been completed. The actual inspection, maintenance or modification tasks are often carried out by contractor personnel, mainly from the mechanical trade. Verification of the performed work tasks is very crucial in order to ensure that the work has been carried out in compliance with all steering documentation, such as procedures, instructions, isolation plans, work descriptions, torque tables, etc.
Verifications and verification failures
Vinnem and Røed (2013) have described a recommended practice to follow during isolation, It should be observed that with 'no verification failure' this implies that the verification did not influence the occurrence of the leak, such as when the leak occurs immediately when the error is made. It should also be observed that all of the cases in Figure   3 are leaks, implying that operational errors have been made at some point.
Verification omission failure is always the highest contribution, except for error types B6 and C2, where the contributions are low and equal (one each). The omission failure 13 implies failure to carry out verification in compliance with isolation plan. This is typically what often is referred to as 'silent deviations'. Silent deviations imply that an unofficial practice is accepted on the installation, whereby it is acceptable not to follow procedures and instructions.
As an illustration of relevant incidents, the following could be considered: two mechanics and an area operator were involved in recertification of two pressure safety valves.
After having replaced the first valve two persons were working on reinstatement of isolations for the first valve. The third person started to loosen one bolt on the flange of the second valve, before the necessary isolations had been implemented. A part of the gasket was blown out from the flange, resulting in a gas leak. Obviously, this was not according to the required work practice and isolation plan, and it was also lack of verification of isolation before the work started.
Finally, it could be observed that with exception of two events, all of the incidents with verification failures in Figure 3 have occurred in one company. Figure 4 shows the distribution of verification failure types for leaks associated with manual intervention for different periods of the day. The dayshift covers the two periods 07-12
Verification failures and time of leak
(actually the period 0700-1259) and 13-18 (i.e. 1300-1859). Vinnem (2012a) has documented that significantly more leaks occur during night shift than what should be expected, especially during the period from midnight until 0700 when dayshift starts. It is prohibited on NCS to conduct activities during the period after midnight which may imply increased risk. It would therefore be expected that the leaks should be at a minimum during this period. Figure 4 shows that the vast majority (75% of the verification failures) of the leaks in this period is associated with failure to carry out required verification activities. 
Verification failures and root causes
It is indicated in Røed, Vinnem and Nistov (2012) root causes are extracted from the investigation reports, in fact this is the only information that has been copied in extenso from the investigation reports without independent assessment. Figure 5 shows the root causes as It is unlikely that these differences are statistically significant, due to the low number of root causes in each category, but these differences are nevertheless interesting to note.
They point in the direction of management system weaknesses for those leaks with verification failure. (Cullen, 1990) with 168 fatalities started with a lack of compliance with procedures for work permits on the installation. An important issue is therefore how compliance with steering documentation may be kept at a highest possible level. This is discussed in Section 4.2.
Verification failures and use of work permits
Work permit (WP) is the administrative tool used in order to control manual work (interventions), for inspection, maintenance and modification. But activities that are considered as part of 'normal operation' are not controlled by work permits, they are carried out according to operations procedures, and are as such 'outside the work permit regime'.
Leaks in the period 2008-2012 are presented in Figure 6 with respect to the relevance of the WP regime.
The occurrences in Figure 6 are those where WP would be relevant, because manual intervention has been carried out. This implies that leaks associated with normal operation and plant shutdown periods are not considered, as well as faults that have been present since fabrication phase. It is demonstrated that one to three leaks per year could have been eliminated if work permit and isolation plan had been prepared and compliance had been ensured. with steering documentation may also be a common factor. But the risk controls, the possible actions to reduce risk, will be significantly different. Also the time sequences and the intervals may be very different.
Occupational accidents occur more frequently than even major accident precursors, which imply that feedback of experience is achieved regularly without too long delay. In the case of major accident precursors, there may be a long delay between actions that are taken and the feedback with respect to the effect of these actions. The research into accident investigations and the learning from investigations need to take this into account.
We therefore consider it essential to make clear distinctions between major accidents and occupational accidents for the analysis of circumstances and investigations and identification of possible risk reduction actions. The present study is limited to one type of major accident precursors only. The disadvantage of this is that the data basis is limited considerably, when will affect the robustness of the findings.
In spite of using all available company internal investigation reports for major hazard precursor events, there are only about 25-30 leaks where a large set of variables could be identified from the available documentation for the period 2008-2012. This is quite a limited data set, but has the main advantage that only the last five year period is used, implying that conditions and premises are reasonably constant. But even during this relatively short period there may be significant differences, as discussed below.
The accident investigations are relatively vague when it comes to the verification and possible errors in verification. The descriptions had to be interpreted quite extensively in order to determine if verifications had been carried out and to what extent they were successful. Some uncertainty is thus introduced.
Lack of compliance on offshore installations
Lack of compliance with steering documentation has been the strongest influencing factor behind HC leaks on NCS for many years. 22 out of 56 leaks in total for the period [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] are associated with verification failure, which reflect lack of compliance. One company appears to have had significant challenges in this regard.
Austnes- Underhaug et al. (2011) have documented that the safety culture has had severe weaknesses, including lack of ability to learn from previous incidents and accidents as well as lack of compliance with steering documentation. The company has worked profoundly to improve its performance, and the reduced number of HC leaks due to manual interventions in 2012 may be a first sign that this work has been fruitful. Dahl and Olsen (2013) has shown that management leadership is essential for employees' compliance with rules and procedures. This is based on data from a questionnaire survey, and is most likely reflecting mainly occupational accidents. But there is no reason why this should be different between occupational accidents and major accident precursors.
The implementation of the 'A-standard' work pattern has strong links with management and supervisory leadership.
Independent verification of manual performance according to rules, procedures or checklists is used in other high risk contexts, such as for instance pilot preparation for take-off and landing of commercial aircrafts. Pilots are high skilled employees with profound insight into requirements for safe take-off or landing. An independent verification of the adherence to checklists is nevertheless always required in the cockpit. Process and mechanical personnel on offshore installations are not as drilled as pilots, and perform less standardized tasks compared to pilots. The need for independent verification should correspondingly be even stronger in this context. But the need for verification appears to be less well accepted, at least in some companies. Vinnem (2012b) has documented that a too large proportion of the leaks occur between midnight and start of dayshift, when operations that increase risk are prohibited due to regulations. It has been shown, see Figure 4 , that the majority of the leaks in the middle of the night are associated with verification failure. This is likely to be strongly influenced by the low manning level on night shift on many installations, whereby only one process operator often is working during night shift. This implies that verification may only be carried out by the next shift. This is obviously not ideal, as it may be skipped due to time pressure, or it may fail to reveal errors that have been made.
The way to perform verification is in all cases a matter of discussion, especially with respect to roles of the responsible process technician and a colleague or supervisor performing the independent verification. These two persons may choose one of the following ways to perform their independent tasks:
 Shall the two persons work together in a pair, conscious of their independent roles, but walking together to make sure they relate to the same equipment?
 Shall the two persons work separately from each other, in order to ensure complete independence?
20 Different practices are chosen by different companies. There is probably no unique solution which is always preferable, when it is considered that a large process module may have more than 100 process valves, of which maybe only a dozen will need to be operated during the isolation. Some of these valves may be several meters up above the deck level, perhaps partly hidden by other equipment.
Work on offshore installations outside work permit regime
Some of the manual interventions in the process systems are carried out according to standard operational procedures, i.e. outside the work permit regime. There has been in the order of one or two leaks (>0.1 kg/s) per year in the period 2008-2012 where no work permit and no isolation plan has been prepared, the work is done according to operational procedures. With the low total number of leaks in 2012, one or two leaks per year are substantial contributions to the leak frequency, and hence need to be focused upon.
The use of standard operating procedures is likely not to have sufficient emphasis on the verification element as an essential operational barrier element. The recommended practice (Vinnem & Røed, 2013 ) that has been proposed for isolation, execution and reinstatement as described above, has increased the emphasis on verification and its importance. Such increase of importance is not likely to affect standard operating procedures unless the operating procedures are actively amended in order to increase the importance of verification.
Conclusions and recommendations
There has been substantial improvement in the frequency of HC leaks above 0.1 kg/s per installation year over the past 16-17 years. The last seven to eight years has on the other hand demonstrated that there is very variable risk potential from one year to the next. This illustrates the potential threat from this type of events; the next leak may, even though very unlikely, follow the path of Piper Alpha if there is a massive failure of barrier functions.
Verification has been demonstrated to be a very critical operational barrier element.
The main failure mechanism is that independent verification of isolation planning, implementation and reinstatement is not carried out in compliance with steering documentation. A best practice description for isolation work in association with manual intervention on process systems has been proposed, mainly in order to strengthen the emphasis on verifications. 
